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A combination of electronic commerce and the
"Flat Tax" could eliminate the IRS as we know it.
BY PROFESSOR DANiEl S. GOLDBERG
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Owthat April 15 has come
and gone, and income tax
filing is just a fond mem-
ory, one wonders what
life in America would be
like without our annual correspondence
with the IRS. Indeed, what would a spring
be without the searching for 1099s, finding
a year's worth of old brokerage company
stock records, receipts for charitable con-
tributions, and the somehow misplaced but
required valuations of personal properry
given to chariry. In short, March madness.
Perhaps surprisingly, neither an April
15 deadline nor the IRS as we currently
know it is necessary for raising revenue for
the Federal government. Imagine a credit
invoice, European-style Value Added Tax
(VAT) collected much like a retail sales
tax, except that it is collected in pieces, at
all stages of production, thereby making
evasion more difficult. Further imagine
that it is collected automatically on all
electronic transactions, which include
credit card purchases, checks cleared elec-
tronically (now the bulk of all checks),
and electronic funds transfers-these
account for the vast bulk of commerce
today. Then add on the requirement for
all remaining transactions, including cash
retail purchases, as well.
Such a system would eliminate the
need for annual filing for taxpayers, other
than VAT collecting-businesses, who would
have to reconcile VAT collections and
VAT credits (which, as we've seen, would
already have been tracked electronically).
Abandoning the income tax as it cur-
rently exists would result in huge savings
of government tax administration expenses,
tax preparer and planner expenses, and
taxpayer expenses. (This last item has been
computed by estimating the number of
hours spent on income tax compliance and
planning by individuals and businesses, and
multiplying that number by a reasonable
hourly rate.) The aggregate savings could
amount to berween $75 billion (in 1989
dollars) as estimated by Joel Slemrod, in
his article on a simple tax system in
Economic Effects of FundamentaL Tax
Reform, and approximately $225 billion
(in 1995 dollars) as projected by the con-
sulting firm Arthur D. Little. Subtract the
much more modest costs of the substitute
system and you determine the net savings
from the elimination of what economists
call the deadweight loss in the current tax
system. (No offense intended to either
myself or my tax colleagues in the bar.)
What about fairness and progressiviry?
Can a tax on consumption replacing an
income tax equitably allocate the burdens of
the costs of government and redistribution
of wealth payments? Further, can a VAT
be "fair" if everybody pays tax in the same
proportion as their consumption? These are
questions that must be resolved politically.
A consumption tax, that is, a tax based
on what individuals consume, rather than
on what they earn as under an income tax,
is viewed by economists as superior to an
income tax. Whether done as a VAT, as
described above, or by computing income,
as is currently done under the income tax,
and then allowing a deduction for savings,
thereby leaving only consumption in the
tax base, a consumption tax relieves
amounts invested from the burdens of tax-
ation and limits taxation to amounts spent
on consumption. In that manner it
encourages saving.
Most economists believe that a change
to a consumption tax from our current
system would stimulate capital formation,
thereby creating greater production and
efficiency, and generally enlarging the pie.
This view, of course, is not without con-
troversy and detractors, but it is gaining
support among policymakers.
One of the stumbling blocks for
acceptance of consumption taxes has been
the argument that it places an undue tax
burden on those earning lower wages. But
the issue of progressiviry can be handled
under a VAT form of consumption tax. In
general, a VAT, like a sales tax, would be
imposed at a single rate on all purchases,
although in theory, different goods can be
assigned different VAT rates (e.g. higher
rates for luxury goods), resulting in signif-
icant computational and administrative
complexiry as it does in Europe. Without
that complexiry, opponents of a VAT
believe that the absence of progressiviry
should disqualify it from consideration as a
replacement for the income tax, regardless
of its other merits.
A VAT, however, can be made progres-
sive without necessarily assigning different
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rates to different types of goods. Suppose,
for example, wages were treated as the
purchase of raw materials, and were there-
by subject to the VAT. Employers would
be allowed a VAT credit for the tax paid
on those wages. The wage earner, however,
would treat the wages and the VAT funds
paid by the employer as taxable under a
new wage tax; that the new wage tax would
be imposed using progressive rates. The
employer-paid VAT on those wages would
be viewed as advance payments by the wage
earners on the tax they would eventually
pay, as if those employer-paid VAT pay-
ments were employee-withheld tax pay-
ments, similar to withholding under the
current income tax. Then, it would be a
simple matter to construct a wage tax rate
structure to accomplish progressiviry, The
structure could have a zero bracket for
low-wage earners, who would get a refund
for withheld taxes (and even an earned
income tax credit, if that were desired); a
moderate rate of tax for middle wage earn-
ers, who would neither get a refund nor
pay extra tax; and a higher rate for high-
wage earner, who would owe some tax.
Capital gains, dividends, interest, and other
investment income would not be taxed at
the individual level. Businesses owned by
those investors, however, would have
already paid the bulk of the taxes needed
by the government through the VAT.
The consumption (not income) tax
system that I described above is the subject
of my recent article entitled "E Tax: The
Flat Tax as an Electronic Credit VAT,"
published in Tax Notes; the background
and justifications are more fully described
in my earlier article "E-Tax: Fundamental
Tax Reform and The Transition to a
Currency-Free Economy," published in
Virginia Tax Review.
The system is based on the "Flat Tax"
proposed by economists Robert Hall and
Alvin Rabushka, which became the cen-
terpiece (indeed, the only piece) of Steve
Forbes' presidential nomination campaign
several years ago, but has some important
differences-naturally, I would call them
improvements. These improvements would
make the E-Tax easier and much less
expensive to administer than the Flat Tax,
and much easier and less expensive than
the current income tax, because it can
be collected and tracked electronically.
It also bears a resemblance to President
Bush's Tax Reform Panel's proposed
"Growth and Investment Tax, or GIT,"
also a consumption tax.
Philip Morrison, a principal in Deloirte
Tax LLP's Washington international tax
group, recently criticized the GIT for sig-
nificant shortcomings in redressing the
U.S.'s disadvantage in international trade,
because of its choice of a tax on business.
(He detailed his points in an article in the
Feb. 16,2006 issue of the BNA Daily Tax
Report.) That kind of tax is likely to be
viewed as a "direct tax," and would thereby
be deemed illegal under U.S. World Trade
Organization obligations. The credit
invoice VAT, on the other hand, is techni-
cally a tax on transactions, and therefore
an indirect tax. Morrison noted, however,
that my E-Tax proposal solves this problem
as well, because a credit invoice VAT need
not be collected on exports without violat-
ing WTO rules.
Finally, even if the E-Tax or some other
form of consumption tax were to be con-
sidered for adoption, could we get there
from here? I am in the midst of studying
the difficulties of transition from our hybrid
income tax to various forms of consump-
tion tax. Probably the greatest obstacle to
its adoption would be the adverse effects
of such a tax on existing wealth, used to
purchase consumption goods and services.
How does this kind of tax policy analysis
relate to the teaching of income tax, cor-
porate tax, and partnership tax?Advocating
the replacement of a tax system with a bet-
ter one requires knowing the positive
attributes of the current tax system, as well
as its defects and blemishes. It is only with
knowing and understanding the nature of
those attributes, and the myriad defects
that attend them, that we can devise ways
to exploit them. A complete and well-
rounded knowledge of the system assists
in both compliance and planning. As a
teacher, I strive to integrate this continually
changing body of knowledge into the
repertoire of all of my law school courses.
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